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 We examine the criticisms made by Aleklett et al. of the IEA oil production outlook.
 The authors incorrectly compare depletion rates from regions and groups of ﬁelds.
 The reductions to future oil production the authors consider necessary are not valid.
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a b s t r a c t
This paper discusses the criticisms of the IEAWorld Energy Outlook raised by Aleklett et al. (2010), often
referred to as the ‘Uppsala critique’. The major argument of Aleklett et al. is that the rates of depletion,
the ratio of annual production to remaining resources or reserves, assumed by the IEA in certain
categories of ﬁelds are unreasonable. In this paper, we call into question the reductions in future global
oil production that Aleklett et al. argue are necessary: they have incorrectly applied a depletion rate for
all ﬁelds within a region to different subsets of ﬁelds within a region. The more minor reductions to
future global oil production that Aleklett et al. argue are needed because of the IEA modelling of the
production of bitumen and natural gas liquids are also examined brieﬂy.
& 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Aleklett et al. (2010) analysed the central oil production
projection generated by the International Energy Agency (IEA,
2008) in its 2008 World Energy Outlook (WEO). Aleklett et al.
consider that the IEA's outlook is unduly optimistic for four
principle reasons, in that it
1. included an optimistic increase in production from discovered
but undeveloped ﬁelds;
2. included an optimistic increase in production from undiscov-
ered ﬁelds;
3. included optimistic assumptions for natural bitumen recovered
by in situ technologies up to 2030; and
4. included an increase in future production of natural gas liquids
(NGLs) which is not matched by a commensurate increase in
natural gas production, with production of NGLs expressed in
volumetric and not energetic terms.
This has subsequently been referred to as the ‘Uppsala critique’
(by e.g. Miller, 2011), and it continues to be used to criticise the
outlooks produced by the IEA (see e.g. Chapman, 2014). This short
comment piece thus seeks to investigate the validity of these
criticisms.
2. Background to depletion rates
Aleklett et al. (2010) estimate that the ﬁrst two of the points
above alone warrant a reduction of 19.4 million barrels per day
(mb/d) in production by 2030 from the levels suggested by the IEA
in its 2008 WEO (106.4 mb/d).1 The reasoning behind both of
these points is the IEA's use of what Aleklett et al. consider to be
unrealistically high ‘depletion rates’.
The depletion rate in its most general sense is the ratio of
annual production to some proportion of the resource base within
a ﬁeld, country, or region. The resource can be a variety of different
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1 These production ﬁgures include all sources of conventional and unconven-
tional oil, NGLs, processing gains, and unconventional liquids (such as coal-to-
liquids and gas-to-liquids), but exclude biofuels. Aleklett et al. (2010) quote the
2030 production level generated by the IEA as 101.5 mb/d. The difference from the
level actually given by the IEA (106.4 mb/d) results from their modiﬁcation of
reporting NGL production on an energy-equivalent basis (i.e. in million barrels of
oil equivalent) rather than as a volume. This is discussed in more detail below.
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estimates: the ultimately recoverable resource (URR), the remaining
ultimately recoverable resources (RURR), or existing reserves.
The RURR is the difference between the URR and cumulative
production up to any given date. By the normal deﬁnitions RURR
estimates consist of the sum of remaining reserves (see below),
potential future reserve growth, and undiscovered resources (see
e.g. Sorrell et al., 2010).
If the URR is used on the denominator of the depletion rate,
then the denominator is essentially ﬁxed.2 If the RURR is placed on
the denominator, then as annual production proceeds, this
denominator will change as cumulative production is subtracted
from the remaining resources.
It has been well established that annual production from most
oil ﬁelds rises to a maximum, reaches a peak or plateau, and then
declines (Höök et al., 2009). Over these stages of a ﬁeld's life, the
depletion rate tends to increase prior to the peak in production
and reach a maximum value at the peak. If it is assumed that the
subsequent decline in production from that ﬁeld will be exponen-
tial (a common assumption, but one which is not always correct
(Sorrell and Speirs, 2010)), then the rate of depletion remains
constant at exactly the assumed decline rate.
The behaviour of regional depletion rates is slightly different, as
there are additional volumes of oil that can be included within the
URR or RURR of the region from which no production has
occurred. For example, there may be large volumes of undiscov-
ered oil estimated to exist within a region. These volumes would
be included in the regional URR or RURR, but would not have
contributed to total annual production from that region. Conse-
quently, it is important to recognise that the depletion rate for a
region ought to be less than the weighted sum of the depletion
rates of the producing ﬁelds within that region.
Another example of an important potential addition to the URR
or RURR of a region is the volume of oil held in ﬁelds that have
been discovered but not developed. When there are also no
existing plans for them to be developed, these are sometimes
called ‘Potential Additional Resources’ (by DECC, 2013), or alter-
natively ‘fallow ﬁelds’. Although the volumes in these ﬁelds are
often small, they can have an important impact on a calculated
depletion rate, especially in a mature country or region.3 A much
more detailed discussion of the dynamics of depletion rates is
provided by Höök et al. (2009).
As noted above, the denominator can also be taken to be remaining
reserves, in which case the depletion rate is simply the inverse of the
commonly quoted R/P ratio. However, a number of different reserve
estimates could be used. Reserves are a subset of the ultimately
recoverable resources, and are those volumes of oil that are currently
technically and economically producible and which have a deﬁned
probability of being produced. The various reserve deﬁnitions that
could be used have been well documented (see e.g. McGlade and
Ekins, 2014; McGlade, 2012; Sorrell et al., 2009), but of most
importance is the difference between ‘proved’ (1P), ‘proved and
probable’ (2P), and ‘proved, probable and possible’ (3P) estimates.
Broadly speaking 1P estimates are the most conservative, and most
frequently used in the R/P ratio, while 2P estimates are the median
estimate of the reserves for a given ﬁeld, country or region. Since 1P
estimates are more conservative than 2P estimates, a depletion rate
using 1P reserves on the denominator will tend to be larger than the
one using 2P. This applies whether the denominator of the depletion
rate ratio is solely reserves, or an estimate of the URR of which
reserves are a subset.
3. Depletion rates calculated by Aleklett et al.
Aleklett et al. (2010) use the RURR in their depletion rates i.e.
annual production on the nominator and URR minus cumulative
production up to that year on the denominator. They ﬁrst estimate
depletion rates in different regions over extended time periods,
relying on historical production and their own estimates of the
URR in each. In the North Sea for example, they estimate that the
URR was initially 75 Gb, and had a depletion rate that rose at
around 0.2–0.3%/year from 1975 to 2000 and plateaued at around
6%. Of the regions analysed, they calculate that the depletion rate
in the UK has plateaued at the highest level (around 6.9%) and has
been around 2–3% for Middle Eastern countries.
It is unclear whether Aleklett et al. (2010) have used 1P, 2P or 3P
reserve estimates in their URR estimates. In the following discussion, it
is assumed that Aleklett et al., when they compare depletion rates for
different categories of ﬁelds and regions, have relied on consistent
reserve deﬁnitions; if they have not done so, then this is a funda-
mental error that would undermine their conclusions. Aleklett et al.
(2010) also do not make it clear to what extent undiscovered oil and
reserve growth have been included in their regional URR estimates.
Aleklett et al. (2010) next look at the depletion rates that are
implicitly assumed by the IEA for two categories of ﬁelds in its 2008
WEO. These two categories are undiscovered ﬁelds and ‘discovered
but undeveloped ﬁelds’. The latter of these categories is further
disaggregated into four groups: undeveloped onshore OPEC ﬁelds,
undeveloped offshore OPEC ﬁelds, undeveloped non-OPEC onshore
ﬁelds, and undeveloped non-OPEC offshore ﬁelds. The estimates of the
RURR that Aleklett et al. use on the denominator of the depletion rates
for these four groups and for the undiscovered category (which they
investigate on a global level only) rely upon resource estimates
provided by the IEA. Aleklett et al. estimate the implied depletion
rate by dividing the IEA's projection of annual production from each
category of ﬁeld by the remaining ultimately recoverable resources at
those ﬁelds (i.e. the URRminus cumulative production). They conclude
that the IEA has assumed depletion rates that rise well above 12% in
three of the four groups of discovered but undeveloped ﬁelds and rise
to just below 10% for the category of undiscovered ﬁelds.
The IEA indicates that the resource estimates for all four of the
more disaggregated groups within the category of discovered but
undeveloped ﬁelds rely upon data from the consultancy IHS CERA.
Data from IHS CERA is for 2P reserve estimates (as stated explicitly by
the IEA, 2008), and so the URR estimates used in the depletion rate
calculations by Aleklett et al. (2010) for these four groups contain only
2P reserves. The resource estimates do not appear to include any
potential volumes coming from the technical drivers of reserve
growth, such as the potential use of enhanced oil recovery (although
this is unclear), and they have been selected so that the URR has an
undiscovered resource component equal to zero (as the groups strictly
contain only ﬁelds that have already been discovered).
For the URR used in the undiscovered category, Aleklett et al.
(2010) have taken the volume that the IEA (2008) indicates is ‘the
projected discovery of 114 billion barrels of reserves worldwide over
the projection period’. In other words, the URR estimate used by
Aleklett et al. is the total volume of oil projected to be discovered
globally between the end of 2007 and 2030. It is unclear what
deﬁnition of ‘reserves’ is being used for this estimate of 114 Gb,
and it is also unclear whether it includes any volumes of reserve
2 The URR should, strictly speaking, be deﬁned and estimated so that it is a
ﬁxed value (McGlade, 2012). However, historic estimates of the global URR have
tended to change over time (see e.g. Ahlbrandt, 2006); this discussion is not
relevant to the arguments set out in this paper.
3 These ‘Potential Additional Resources’ do not have a ‘reasonable timetable for
development’ (or similar) (SPE, 2008) that is required for them to be classiﬁed as
reserves. Equally they are not undiscovered, and so we classify them here as reserve
growth. Reserve growth has multiple drivers, but in this paper it is important to
clarify that it can come from: volumes in fallow ﬁelds, the use of advanced
technologies such as enhanced oil recovery, changes in geological understanding,
as well as from numerous deﬁnitional changes (see McGlade, 2012 for a more
detailed discussion).
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growth from factors such as enhanced oil recovery since this is not
explicitly mentioned. It can, however, be assumed that both
reserves are discovered but undeveloped volumes of oil are not
included (or equivalently are included, but are equal to zero).
Aleklett et al. (2010) argue that since the depletion rates
assumed by the IEA in these categories of ﬁelds are much larger
than the rates previously observed in the regions, lower depletion
rates should actually be applied. For the four groups of undeve-
loped ﬁelds, they lower the depletion rates from the levels
suggested from 2010 onwards. These eventually reach much lower
maximum levels of between 2% and 7% between 2020 and 2025.
For undiscovered ﬁelds, they suggest that depletion rates should
be lowered from 2019 onwards and should reach a maximum of
around 3.5% in 2030. By assuming lower depletion rates for these
categories of ﬁelds, Aleklett et al. argue that production cannot rise
nearly as quickly as indicated by the IEA throughout the projection
period. These reductions lead to their claim that global production
of all oil in 2030 should be lowered by 19.4 mb/d.
This argument may be somewhat ﬂawed however. For both
categories of ﬁelds, Aleklett et al. have compared the depletion
rate from a whole region (e.g. the North Sea) with that for a
selected subset of ﬁelds within a region (e.g. undeveloped,
onshore OPEC ﬁelds). This is not comparing like-with-like.
As discussed above, the depletion rate Aleklett et al. estimated
for the North Sea (for example) assumes that the denominator of
the depletion rate on a given date should be the RURR: URR minus
cumulative production up to that date. The URR for the North Sea
will contain volumes from ﬁelds that are classiﬁed as reserves,
volumes estimated to be undiscovered, and volumes from antici-
pated future reserve growth.
Looking ﬁrst at the four groups of discovered but undeveloped
ﬁelds, as mentioned above, there is ambiguity over whether any
reserve growth has been included in the IEA resource estimate.
However, it is clear that no undiscovered resources are included.
For the regions on the other hand, the URR estimates contain
undiscovered volumes. Production obviously cannot have occurred
from these ﬁelds historically, and so the depletion rate for the
region contains ﬁelds whose resources are included in the
denominator, but from which there is no production (on the
nominator). For the category of discovered but undeveloped ﬁelds,
no resources from which there is no production are included,
because any such resources have been speciﬁcally excluded from
the denominator. In other words, estimates of the URR of dis-
covered but undeveloped ﬁelds within a region are necessarily
lower than estimates of the URR of the region as a whole, since the
latter includes the resources of undiscovered ﬁelds. It is therefore
unsurprising that the depletion rate calculated for the IEA category
of ﬁelds is larger than the depletion rate for the region.
A slightly different argument explains why Aleklett et al.
calculate a signiﬁcantly larger depletion rate for the undiscovered
category of ﬁelds than for any of the regions. It is worth restating
that the resource estimate Aleklett et al. used for the denominator
of depletion rate for the undiscovered category included only
volumes that were discovered between 2007 and 2030. This is not
a true estimate of the total undiscovered resources of all undis-
covered ﬁelds: Aleklett et al. have excluded any resources from
ﬁelds that could be discovered after 2030.
Estimates of the remaining volumes of global undiscovered oil
vary signiﬁcantly (see e.g. McGlade, forthcoming; Sorrell et al.,
2009). However, of the publically available estimates, the lowest is
given by Campbell (2013), who estimates that total volumes
discovered from 2010 onwards will be 113 Gb. Many sources lie
approximately in the range 200–350 Gb (see e.g. the various
studies reported by Bentley et al., 2009), while the latest global
assessment by the United States Geological Survey is around
825 Gb (including NGL) (Brownﬁeld et al., 2012; EIA, 2011; USGS,
2011). Campbell (2013) uses a very narrow deﬁnition of oil,4 which
likely underestimates all oil that can be discovered over the rest of
time. The ﬁgure of 114 Gb used by Aleklett et al. (2010) is therefore
not a true URR of all undiscovered ﬁelds (as of 2007) globally.
Aleklett et al. (2010) have therefore excluded the resources of
ﬁelds that cannot contribute to production over the projected time
period when examining the IEA category of ﬁelds, but included the
resources of ﬁelds that have not contributed to production over
the historical period when examining the regions. This difference
means that the depletion rate for the category of ﬁelds will be
larger than the depletion rates for the regions.
It is worth explicitly drawing a distinction between the IEA
category of undiscovered ﬁelds and a single basin prior to its ﬁrst
oil discovery, e.g. the UK North Sea in the mid-1960s. An analogy
could be drawn between the depletion rates of the IEA category
and the UK North Sea, but only if one was to construct a URR for
the UK North Sea that included volumes of oil that were produced,
discovered, or classiﬁed as reserves within a well-deﬁned time
period (say between 1965 and 1995), and excluded the resources
that could be discovered after this time.
For reserve growth, as mentioned above, it is ambiguous
whether volumes from factors such as enhanced oil recovery have
been included in the URR estimates for the two IEA categories of
ﬁelds (although it appears unlikely). However, it is evident that
volumes from fallow ﬁelds, another driver of reserve growth, are
likely included in the regional estimates of URR but not in the IEA
category of undiscovered ﬁelds. This discrepancy means that the
depletion rates calculated for the undiscovered category appear to
be more different than they would do if consistent URRs were to
be used for both.
In summary, when calculating the depletion rates for the IEA
category of undeveloped ﬁelds, Aleklett et al. (2010) have used
spatially restrictive URRs, which only contain volumes of reserves,
and compared this to spatially more inclusive URRs (for the
regions), which also include estimates of resources in undiscov-
ered ﬁelds. For the IEA category of undiscovered ﬁelds, Aleklett
et al. have used a temporally restrictive URR, which only contains
volumes from ﬁelds discovered within a certain timeframe, and
compared this to temporally more inclusive URRs (for the regions),
which also include estimates of resources in ﬁelds that could be
produced over all time. In the latter case, Aleklett et al. have also
included volumes from fallow ﬁelds in the regional URRs but
excluded these from the category of ﬁelds.
The exclusion of certain elements of the URR from the denomi-
nator can have a major effect on the estimated depletion rate. This
is illustrated in Fig. 1. Taking the latest data from the UK Depart-
ment of Energy and Climate Change (DECC, 2013) on UK resources,
and data from BP (2013) for historical UK production, the UK's URR
is estimated to be around 42.4 Gb. This comprises 6.1 Gb of current
2P reserves, 2.1 Gb in discovered but undeveloped ﬁelds, 1.9 Gb of
possible reserves (both of these two volumes have the potential to
contribute via reserve growth), and 5.8 Gb of undiscovered oil, and
26.5 Gb of cumulative production that has occurred since the
beginning of development of the UK North Sea. With the RURR on
the denominator (i.e. 42.4 Gb minus cumulative production up to
the date in question), the depletion rate reaches a maximum of
around 4.5%. If undiscovered and reserve growth resources are
excluded from the denominator (i.e. 32.6 Gb minus cumulative
production up to the date in question),5 this maximum rate almost
doubles to 8.5%. This demonstrates that excluding certain
4 Campbell (2013) analyses ‘Regular conventional oil’, which includes all oil
identiﬁed above as conventional oil except for: crude oil o17:51API, oil found at
water depths greater than 500 m, Arctic oil, and NGL from gas plants.
5 This has been calculated using 42.42.11.95.8¼32.6 Gb.
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categories of oil (in this case reserve growth and undiscovered oil)
can signiﬁcantly alter the calculated depletion rate for a region.
There are two options to provide a more appropriate critique of
the IEA production projections using depletion rates. First, one
could compare depletion rates assumed from all ﬁelds in a given
IEA region. In this region, the denominator of the depletion rate
should include resources from the sum of current reserves,
undiscovered ﬁelds and reserve growth, and the numerator the
production from all of these ﬁelds. For example, one could
compare the total depletion rate for all onshore OPEC ﬁelds (not
just discovered and undeveloped ﬁelds) with the historical deple-
tion rates that Aleklett et al. (2010) derive for the various other
regions examined.
Second, one could calculate historical depletion rates for a
selected group of ﬁelds from a region e.g. ﬁelds that were at one
point considered undiscovered but that have subsequently been
discovered and brought into production within a certain time-
frame. This rate could then be compared directly with the deple-
tion rates that the IEA uses (as calculated by the Uppsala group) for
the groups of ﬁelds in the various categories mentioned above.
One example of this has been carried out in Fig. 1 for the depletion
rate with the initial URR that includes only cumulative production
and current 2P reserves on the denominator (and thus excludes
reserve growth and undiscovered ﬁelds). This is a temporally
restrictive depletion rate, which includes only the production
from, and resources of, ﬁelds that have produced any volumes of
oil or are currently classiﬁed as reserves. This is more equivalent to
the IEA category of undiscovered ﬁelds that includes only the
production from, and resources of, ﬁelds that are discovered
within the IEA model timeframe. The difference between these
calculated depletion rates is around 1%.
In conclusion, without performing analysis along these lines, it
is difﬁcult for Aleklett et al. (2010) to argue that the imposed
reduction in depletion rates, and hence overall production rates, is
justiﬁed, or that the IEA has been optimistic in its assumptions.
4. Production of bitumen and natural gas liquids
The remaining two points in the above list are somewhat
different. Concerning the third of these points, the IEA suggested
in situ bitumen recovery production would reach 4.5 mb/d by
2030, a ﬁgure Aleklett et al. (2010) considered was 2.3 mb/d too
high. Projections from both the CAPP (2013) and the NEB (2011)
suggest that there is certainly the potential for in situ recovery to
increase to the levels suggested by the IEA (these two organisa-
tions suggest rises to 5.2 mb/d and 4.7 mb/d in 2030). The salient
point is therefore whether there will be sufﬁcient investment in
these projects to bring this production on line; whether the IEA
estimate is too high or not remains a matter of opinion unless this
is modelled in a detailed manner, which Aleklett et al. did not do.
Regarding the fourth and ﬁnal of the above points, an impor-
tant issue is raised regarding the inconsistent increases in produc-
tion of NGLs and natural gas. As noted by Aleklett et al. (2010), the
IEA (2008) stated that ‘the average NGL content of gas production is
constant over the projection period’, and so there was a disconnect
between the estimated rise in NGL production and gas production.
The IEA appears to have changed its stance on this issue,
however. It has subsequently indicated that natural gas production
will shift to wetter sources, for example by increased gas produc-
tion in the Middle East which has a higher NGL content (IEA,
2012). In the 2008WEO, the IEA estimated that NGL production (in
volumetric terms) would rise to 19.8 mb/d by 2030, while in the
latest 2012 WEO, it suggests a ﬁgure of around 16 mb/d in 2030.
This latter number is not dissimilar to the level that Aleklett et al.
(2010) indicate is a reasonable level (15.5 mb/d (again in volu-
metric terms)). It thus appears that this criticism raised by Aleklett
et al. was justiﬁed at the time of publication.
On the second criticism of the IEA's handling of NGLs, that NGLs
should be reported in terms of energy rather than volume, it
should be noted that while NGLs undoubtedly do have a lower
energy density than (most) crude oils, NGLs have a wide variety of
uses, and do substitute for oil in a number of sectors. For example
in the United States, as reported by Troner (2013), 55% of NGLs are
used in the petrochemical industries, 20% used as a gasoline
blendstock, 20% used for space heating or fuel, and the remainder
exported. Whether NGLs should be reported in terms of energy or
volume clearly depends on whether it is the energy or volume of
the feedstock used that is important. In the petrochemical indus-
tries, for example, the volume is the important metric, not the
energetic content. If a barrel of NGLs displaces a barrel of crude oil
needed for the same process, then measuring NGLs in volumetric
terms appears to be reasonable. If NGLs are used for an alternative
purpose, in which a given energy is required, for heat for example,
then reporting NGLs as energy would be more useful.
5. Concluding remarks
The IEA produced an outlook for global oil production in 2008.
Aleklett et al. (2010) raised a number of concerns about this
projection, and their paper has since been cited frequently to call
into question the 2008 and subsequent projections. However, a
closer reading reveals that these concerns are not well founded.
They have incorrectly applied a depletion rate for all ﬁelds within a
region to different subsets of ﬁelds within a region: this is not a
like-with-like comparison. It is also argued that bitumen produc-
tion levels are optimistic, but this is not supported by any detailed
modelling, and so the revision suggested by Aleklett et al. is a
matter of opinion. The ﬁnal point, concerning the incommensurate
rise of NGLs and gas production in the 2008 WEO is valid,
however, this has subsequently been modiﬁed by the IEA.
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